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CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REQUIRE DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES
GERALD W. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE notion that the President's power as Commander in Chief gives
him authority to ignore legislation enacted by Congress relating to
the armed forces or national defense appears to be of comparatively
recent origin. "The first impounding of appropriated funds occurred in
1941, when President Roosevelt ordered the impounding of funds appro-
priated for public works not thought to be of an essential defense na-
ture."' Since that time, Presidents have utilized the impounding technique
from time to time to reduce the level of expenditures for an authorized
program, invariably accompanied by Congressional protest.
The problem arises when Congress appropriates more funds for specific
defense purposes than requested by the President, or authorizes and ap-
propriates funds for defense objectives not considered essential by the
Chief Executive. The question then arises as to whether Congress can
require the Executive Department to expend funds for such defense pur-
poses.
Involved in this controversy is the doctrine of the Separation of Pow-
ers, the authority granted Congress and the President over the armed
forces by the Constitution of the United States, and the political and prac-
tical factors involved in the preparation and execution of defense budgets.
The recent controversy over the B-70 strategic bomber (later called
the RS-70 weapon system) highlights the dispute between at least some
of the members of Congress and the Executive relative to the expenditure
of funds appropriated for defense purposes. This controversy is presented
to illustrate the nature of the problem involved.
The discussion in Congress relative to the RS-70 controversy is set forth
herein at considerable length to indicate representative views of Congress-
men. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that we are concerned with
the power of Congress to require certain expenditures. The exertion of
such power as Congress may possess will depend to a great extent on the
individual legislator's concept of Congressional authority in the matter.
Although admittedly transient, the individual viewpoint is nonetheless im-
portant as a guage of the near unanimity of opinion required to impose a
Congressional mandate in this area.
* Colonel, U.S. Army; member of the Nebraska Bar.
1. Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds: With SpZdal
Reference to Grants-In-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 Am. U.L. Rev. 32, 34 (192).
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The power of Congress to compel expenditures for national defense
would technically include the power granted Congress "To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia."2 This aspect is excluded
from the present discussion which is limited, essentially to the broader
aspects of Congressional power to "provide for the common Defence,"'
and the power to "raise and support Armies."'
II. THE RS-70 CONTROVERSY
[T]he Secretary of the Air Force is directed to utilize . . . an amount not less than
$491,000,000 . . . for an RS-70 weapon system. 5
The House Committee on Armed Services recommended that the bill to
authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1963 for the Armed Forces'
include in part, the foregoing provision. The members of the committee
wished that there be no misunderstanding as to their choice of terms:
Lest there be any doubt as to what the RS-70 amendment means let it be said
that it means exactly what it says; i.e., that the Secretary of the Air Force, as an
official of the executive branch, is directed, ordered, mandated, and required to
utilize the full amount of the $491 million authority granted "... for an RS-70
weapon system."'7
Why was the Committee so adamant concerning the utilization of this
authorization? Its members were concerned over what appeared to be
"plans of the Department of Defense... toward the ultimate elimination
of bomber aircraft," and the placing of sole reliance on the interconti-
nental ballistic missile.8 As a result of this concern, Congress had appro-
priated for fiscal year 1962 approximately $695 million, in addition to
that requested by the executive branch, for the procurement of bombers
and for a more vigorous prosecution of the B-70 program. These funds
had not been used by the Defense Department despite a strong expression
of congressional desire that the procurement of bombers be continued
and that a strategic aircraft system be developed.0 The Committee con-
sidered this circumstance as "still another rebuff of congressional will,"
and listed thirteen other recent instances in which appropriations for'
defense expenditures desired by Congress had been disregarded by the
Executive.' °
"[I]s the function of the Congress solely a negative one in that it can
2. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 16.
3. U.S. Coast. art I, § 8, c. 1.
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
5. H.R. Rep. No. 1406, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
6. H.R. 9751, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 1406, supra note 5, at 9.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 4-5. See generally Whelan, Legislative Regulatory Activity in Research and
Development Contracting 59 (1963).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 1406, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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withhold authority or funds and prevent something from being done? Or
can it exercise a positive authority and by affording the means require
something to be done?"'" Thus the Committee posed the question to be
considered in this study.
III. TH DEBATE IN CONGRESS
Discussion of the Armed Forces authorization'-' and appropriation bills
for fiscal year 1963 on the floor of the House and Senate revealed a
divergence of opinion among Congressmen as to whether Congress could,
or should, direct the Executive to expend funds for a purpose desired by
the former but not the latter. 3 This may be illustrated by the following
extracts from the Congressional Record:
[T]he Constitution does not give the legislative body direct authority to require
expenditures of funds appropriated by that body, but this possibly could be
established by the rather dangerous negative approach whereby concessions would
have to be made by both sides. The vwhole matter should be determined on the
basis of whether or not this weapons system is needed to protect our country.14
[I]f I understand the Constitution, . .. the Founding Fathers provided that the
Congress as a legislative body had the privilege and the duty to raise and support
armies, and otherwise provide for the armed defense of the country. While, on
the other hand, the President was set up as the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces.
Therefore, . . . the Committee on Armed Services is unquestionably vthin
its right in insisting that the moneys it authorizes for particular weapons should
be expended by the executive department for that purpose.1'
[W]e have authorized various Presidents, of all types, stripes, and breeds, to do
many things that they have failed or refused to do. . . .I know of no particular
method or means the Congress ... has to compel or to force any President to
expend any funds which may be authorized and appropriated.10
11. Id. at S. The Committee recognized that an authorization act without a correcponding
appropriations act would be ineffectual, but hoped to express a "unanimity of feeling" with
the Appropriations Committee, "backed by the vote of the whole House and the whole
Congress . .. ." Id. at S-9.
12. The Constitution does not speak in terms of authorization of funds. Instead, its
pertinent provision is that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law .. " (US. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). The requirement that
there must be an authorization act before there can be an appropriation stems from the
rules of the House and the Senate. E.g., House Rule *._X-I, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 86th Cong,
1st Sess. 20 (1959). The 'legislative" committees consider authorizations and the Com-
mittees on Appropriations consider appropriations within limits of the authorization.
If an appropriation for which there is no authorization is proposed and becomes law
because no successful point of order was made against it, the appropriation act is con-
sidered to be sufficient in itself.
13. 10S Cong. Rec. 4645-46, 46S9-724, 6303-19, 6S36-49, 10342-31, 14932-33, 15244-45
(1962).
14. Id. at 4645 (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
15. Id. at 4690 (remarks of Representative Colmer).
16. Id. at 4692 (remarks of Representative Brown).
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I ask you-What is Congress' function in defense? Is it a partner? Does it
have a voice? Or is it just Mr. Money-bags, to give or to withhold funds?
That is not what the Constitution says; the Constitution grants the Congress
the exclusive power to raise and support and make rules for our military forces.
The language of t~le Constitution is clear.
Congress does not want to run the Department of Defense-Congress just wants
to sit at the table and get across an idea once in a while. 17
We make that decision in the exercise of our responsibility under the Constitution
as to the size and nature of the Armed Forces we shall have. That is our responsi-
bility and we seek to discharge it. We have no intention to transgress upon the
constitutional duties and responsibilities of our President, as Commander in Chief.
We shall give him our fullest cooperation. We ask of him and of his Secretary of
Defense that they cooperate with us ....
I, for one, shall insist that . .. [the] President .. . recognize the constitutional
responsibility-a right as well as a duty-of the Congress to determine the size
and nature of our Armed Forces.' 8
Several members of the House of Representatives were of the opinion
that Congress clearly did not have the power to, and should not attempt
to direct the Chief Executive to expend funds appropriated by Congress
for a specific defense project.
The question is this: Can Congress only say that we have too much strength, or can
it also say we have too little? ...
A reading of the language: "Congress shall have the power to raise and support
armies" has ... a fairly clear meaning. Raise means get the men-support means
get them the equipment they need. It does not mean to tell them where, or how, or when
to use it; that would be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief.19
[T]he language directing the Secretary of the Air Force, and in effect the Com-
mander in Chief, ... [would be] . . . an unconstitutional invasion of the responsi-
bilities of the Chief Executive....
I do not want the Congress to usurp and take from the Chief Executive authority
that is his.2 0
Congress should not command nor should the Congress direct the President on how
to arm the military forces for the missions the President decides are in the national
interest. The President is the one person in government and in the Nation with all
of the facts and intelligence at his fingertips. He is the man who has to make the big
decisions on weapons ...
[C]ongress should carry out the intent of the Founding Fathers who drafted the
Constitution, and . .. limit our activity to the traditional and time-tested role of
"advise and consent" and "to investigate and propose." 21
This legislation proposes to direct the executive department to spend money which the
president-right or wrongly-had decided not to spend. I do not believe Congress
has the right to so direct the executive, nor should it presume to take that right....
It is inconceivable to me that Congress should tell . . . a general in the field
which weapons to fire. These are the rights and duties of the Executive. We in
17. Id. at 4696 (remarks of Representative Vinson).
18. Id. at 4698 (remarks of Representative Arends).
19. Id. at 4712 (remarks of Representative Pike).
20. Id. at 4714, 4715 (remarks of Representative Ford).
21. Id. at 4716 (remarks of Representative Boland).
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Congress should neither attempt to assume executive powers nor should we relieve
the President of the responsibility for making the right decisions.2-2
Several Senators were of the opinion that Congress could and should
appropriate funds for a specific defense project which it deemed neces-
sary. However, the Chief Executive possessed the power to ignore Con-
gress and not expend the money appropriated.
I believe it is the responsibility of the executive branch to determine v;hat weapons
... are to be obtained for American defense .... But Congress, too, has consti-
tutional responsibilities in the field of defense, and one of them is to make available
moneys to the executive branch to utilize for our Military Establishments... P
It seems that under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the executive branch
can ignore the desires of the legislative branch and refuse to spend the money
appropriated for a specific program....
But regardless of the separation of powers doctrine, it seems to me that Congress,
as an independent branch of the Federal Government, has a duty to go ahead and
reach its own decision on what is or is not wise with respect to the RS-70 pro-
gram.24
If the situation ever comes that our Nation suffers because of a decision by the
Defense Department that we vill put all our eggs in one basket and vil depend
on the long-range missiles, and that decision turns out to be a poor one, they will
not be able to put the blame on Congress....
[The Secretary of Defense] does not have to spend the money, but he has
the responsibility for not spending it.2-
[U]nder article I, section 3, of the Constitution it is our responsibility to decide.
It is stated: "The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States." What we tried to do was to exercise that
responsibility When there is a difference of opinion in the executive branch as to
what may be necessary for the common defense, the argument made appealed
to me ... that we should provide the funds we believe are necessary for national
defense, leaving it to the responsibility of the Executive as to whether he vishes
to use them all or not 6
The debate in Congress revealed not only differences in opinion as to
whether Congress could require the expenditure of funds appropriated
for defense purposes, but also some confusion as to applicable grants of
power under the Constitution. There appeared to be no doubt in the mind
of the Chief Executive. President Kennedy expressed his opinion as fol-
lows in a letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee:
I . . . urge your reconsideration of the language added by your committee to
H.R. 9751. The amendment to which I refer states that the Secretary of the Air
Force is "directed" to utilize not less than $491 million of this authorization ... for
an RS-70 weapons system. I would respectfully suggest that, in place of the word
"directed," the word "authorized" would be more . . . clearly in line vth the
spirit of the Constitution.
22. Id. at 4719 (remarks of Representative Bass).
23. Id. at 10376 (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
24. Id. at 10378 (remarks of Senator Miller).
25. Id. at 15244 (remarks of Senator Robertson).
26. Id. at 15245 (remarks of Senator Saltonstall).
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Each branch of the Government has a responsibility to "preserve, protect and
defend" the Constitution and the clear separation of legislative and executive powers
it requires. I must therefore insist upon the full powers and discretions essential
to the faithful execution of my responsibilities as President and Commander in
Chief, under article II, sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution.
Additionally implicit in the Constitution, of course, is the intent that a spirit of
comity govern relations between the executive and legislative. And while this
makes unwise if not impossible any legislative effort to "direct" the Executive on
matters within the latter's jurisdiction, it also makes it incumbent upon the Executive
to give every possible consideration in such matters to the views of Congress. For
that reason, Secretary [of Defense] McNamara has indicated to you in a separate
letter his willingness to reexamine the RS-70 program and related technological
possibilities.27
A companion letter from the Secretary of Defense stated that a new
study of the RS-70 program would be initiated "in the light of recom-
mendations and the representations of the Armed Services Committee,"
and that if technological developments advanced more rapidly than an-
ticipated "we would then wish to expend whatever proportions of any
increase voted by the Congress, these advances ... would warrant."-8
The Committee then withdrew its proposed "mandate" to the Secretary
of the Air Force.29 Mr. Vinson, the chairman of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee, explained on the floor of the House that the word "di-
rected" had been inserted in the bill to show the intent of Congress and
to force the Department of Defense to take some action. Once assured
that action would be taken, the Committee wished to delete this word
and substitute "authorized." 30 Or as expressed by another Congressman:
[Y]esterday two of the most distinguished Americans of our time met together
and took a little stroll in the Rose Garden behind the White House .. .and dis-
cussed some of the provisions of this bill.
As a result, the Committee ... agreed to . . . change the wording . . . so as
to eliminate the word "directed" and to substitute therefor the word "authorized."'
IV. HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES
Control over the armed forces is divided between the Executive and
the Congress by the Constitution of the United States.2 Experience in
England and the Colonies had convinced the framers of the Constitution
that exclusive control should be vested in neither the executive nor the
27. Id. at 4694. It will be noted that the President did not explicitly deny the power of
Congress to "direct" the use of funds for the purpose stated, although he suggested that the
point was doubtful. The fact that such a strenuous, and successful, effort was made to delete
the term "directed" carries an implied recognition that the Executive would not be free to
ignore such a mandate, as it has felt free to do in the case of appropriations.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 4692-724.
30. Id. at 4693.
31. Id. at 4691 (remarks of Representative Brown).
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, art. II, § 2, c. 1.
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legislative branches of the government.3 3 The Constitution thus declares
that "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States . . ... " Congress is empowered:
To lay and collect Taxes . . . to ... provide for the common defence ...
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
[and]
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. 5
The powers which were to flow from these provisions of the Constitu-
tion were discussed by its proponents. An examination of such explana-
tory documents sheds some light on the authority to be exercised by the
President and by Congress with respect to the armed forces.
First, the powers intrusted to the Federal Government "to provide for
the common defence" were to exist without limitation "because it is im-
possible to foresee or define the extent and variety . . . of the means
which may be necessary to satisfy them."3" Therefore no "constitutional
shackles" were to be imposed, at least upon the Federal Government as
a whole, in the exercise of the authorities to raise armies, to build and
equip fleets, to prescribe rules for the government of both, to direct their
operations, and to provide for their support.37
One of the arguments against the new Constitution was that "provision
has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of
peace."3 In answer, it was pointed out that "the whole power of raising
armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive; [and there
was] . . . an important qualification even of the legislative discretion,
in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of
an army for any longer period than two years .... " Further, "restraints
upon the discretion of the Legislature in respect to military establishments
in time of peace would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from
the necessities of society would be unlikely to be observed."4 0 The danger
from other countries, and from Indians on the western frontier, showed
33. See generally May, The Ultimate Decision: The Preident as Commander in Chief
3-19 (1960).
34. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
35. U.S. Corst. art. I, § S.
36. The Federalist No. 23, at 147 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton). Cf. Conwin, The Spending
Power of Congress, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 54S (1923).
37. The Federalist, op. cit. supra note 36, at 147.
38. Id. No. 24, at 152 (Hamilton).
39. Id. at 153. (Emphasis added.)
40. Id. at 155.
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the "necessity of leaving the matter [of a standing army] to the discretion
and prudence of the legislature."141
It was intended that restraint on the exercise of legislative authority,
in the means of providing for the national defense, would be two-fold.
First, the legislature would be obliged to deliberate upon the propriety
of keeping a military force at least once in every two years, due to pro-
vision limiting appropriations for military purposes to that period of
time. If the majority should be disposed to exceed the proper limits, pub-
lic attention would be roused and measures would be taken by the com-
munity to guard against the danger. Second, successive variations in the
representative body, produced by biennial elections in both houses, would
defeat an attempt to sustain an unwarranted build-up of the armed
forces.42
With respect to the President, as Commander in Chief of the army and
navy, his authority "would amount to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral of the confederacy . . .,,4
It appears, then, that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
the power to establish the size and nature of the armed forces was con-
sidered to reside in Congress. It was recognized that the President has a
qualified negative upon the acts of the legislature,4 4 "calculated to guard
the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any im-
pulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a ma-
jority of that body.145 Specific control over the exercise of legislative
authority concerning the armed forces, however, was considered to be
in their constituents and not in the President.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND EXECUTION OF THE LAWS
The doctrine of the Separation of Powers comprises ... one of the two great struc-
tural principles 46 of the American constitutional system .... [F]rom it certain other
ideas follow fairly logically: First, that the three functions of government are recipro-
cally limiting; Secondly, that each department should be able to defend its character-
istic function from intrusion by either of the other departments; Thirdly, that none
of the departments may abdicate its powers to either of the others.
47
The division of authority and responsibility among the three branches
of the Government was described by Chief Justice John Marshall early
in the Nation's history: "The difference between the departments un-
41. Id. at 157. See Id. No. 25 (Hamilton).
42. Id. No. 26 (Hamilton); id. No. 41 (Madison).
43. Id. No. 69, at 465. See 2 Story, Commentaries § 1492 (5th ed. 1891); cf. Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602 (1850).
44. The power of veto contained in U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
45. The Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
46. The other is the doctrine of Dual Federalism. (Footnote added.)
47. Corwin & Koenig, The Presidency Today 8 (1956).
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doubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the
judiciary construes the law ... .1,48 Over 100 years later the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this basic constitutional division between the three
branches of the Government.4 ' This decision has never been qualified by
the Supreme Court or by the lower Federal courts, °
Disputes as to the respective powers of Congress and the President
seldom resolve themselves into issues that can be settled in the courts. Ac-
cordingly there are few authoritative decisions to be found on the point.
In theory, the Executive power and the Legislative power are independ-
ent and separate, but it is not always easy to draw the line and to say
where Legislative control and direction to the Executive must cease, and
where his independent discretion begins. In theory all the Executive of-
ficers appointed by the President are his subordinates, yet Congress can
undoubtedly pass laws limiting their discretion and commanding a cer-
tain course by them which is not within the power of the Executive to
vary. Fixing the method in which Executive power shall be exercised is
perhaps one of the chief functions of Congress. By its legislation it often
creates a duty in the Executive which did not previously exist. Then in
prescribing how that duty is to be carried out, it imposes restrictions
that the Executive is bound to observeY'
Sometimes it is hard to remember, but under our system of govern-
ment it is the legislative branch which is to make and decide policy. The
executive branch "is supposed to carry out the policies declared by
Congress."M2
There is no provision of the Constitution which specifically requires
the Executive Branch to spend money appropriated by Congress. The
President is required, however, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.""3 Whether this Constitutional provision vested in him discre-
tion as to the execution of acts of Congress was argued in Kendall v.
United States ex tel. Stokes. 4 Postmaster Kendall had disallowed claims
of Stokes for carrying the mail. Congress passed an act directing Kendall
to credit Stokes with the amount due. Kendall again refused to pay the
claim, contending that only the President, under the power to see that
the laws are executed, could require that he pay the claims. The Supreme
Court upheld a mandamus ordering the payment, holding that the Pres-
4S. 'Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 44 (1325).
49. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 1S9 (1923).
50. Brownell, Separation of Powers: Executive and Legislative Branches, 6O Dick. L. Rev.
1 (1955).
51. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 125 (1925).
52. 31 Cong. Dig., No. 1, p. 1, at 2 (1952). See MacLean, President and Congrera:
The Conflict of Powers 61 (1955).
53. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
54. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1833).
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ident was not impowered to dispense with the operation of law upon a
subordinate executive officer. When Congress imposes
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant
to any rights secured and protected by the constitution . . . in such cases, the duty
and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not
to the direction of the President ... r"
To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully
executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the
constitution, and entirely inadmissible. 56
To avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers in April, 1952, which he
believed would jeopardize national defense, President Truman issued an
Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate
most of the steel mills.5 7 According to the Government's argument in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 8 the directive was not founded
on any specific statutory authority, but upon "the aggregate of [the
President's] . . . constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive
and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces .... '" The Secretary
of Commerce issued an order seizing the steel mills and the President
promptly reported these events to Congress, but Congress took no action.
It had provided other methods of dealing with such situations and bad
refused to authorize governmental seizures of property to settle labor
disputes. The steel companies sued the Secretary and the Supreme Court
rejected the broad claim of power asserted by the Chief Executive,
holding that "the order could not properly be sustained as an exercise
of the President's military power as Commander in Chief... nor ... be-
cause of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power
to the President."8 °
The Youngstown case is readily distinguishable on its facts from the
problem of appropriations for defense purposes desired by Congress but
not the President. Pertinent portions are set forth herein at length, how-
ever, since the opinions of members of the Court appear applicable to the
matter at hand.
Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the Court, noted:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitu-
tion limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws lie
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.
The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted
55. Id. at 610.
56. Id. at 613.
57. Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
58. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
59. Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 587.
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shall be vested in a Congress of the United States... ." After granting many powers
to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by the President. ... The power of Congress to adopt such
public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. ... The Consti-
tution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military
supervision or control.
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken posses-
sion of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this
be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make
laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution "in
the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."'"
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, noted that "the power
to recommend legislation, granted to the President, serves only to em-
phasize that it is his function to recommend and that it is the function of
the Congress to legislate. Article II, Section 3 also provides that the Pres-
ident 'shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' But... the
power to execute the laws starts and ends with the laws Congress has
enacted." 2
The three dissenting Justices did not assert that the President could
act contrary to a statute enacted by Congress. They argued that there was
no statute which prohibited the seizure and that there was "no evidence
whatever of any Presidential purpose to defy Congress or act in any way
inconsistent with the legislative will.""
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring with the majority opinion, remarked
on the "poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable
to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present them-
selves."6 He suggested that "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluc-
tuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Con-
gress.116 Justice Jackson then listed the situations in which a President
may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers and indicated the legal
consequences of the factor of relativity to the powers of Congress:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.... If his act is held unconstitu-
tional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as
an undivided whole lacks power....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
61. Id. at 5S7-S9.
62. Id. at 632-33 (concurring opinion).
63. Id. at 703 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 634 (concurring opinion).
65. Id. at 635 (concurring opinion).
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of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power, is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.00
The latter situation (3), as discussed by Mr. Justice Jackson, more
nearly relates to the RS-70 and similar controversies.
Mr. Justice Jackson then noted that "the Constitution expressly places
in Congress power 'to raise and support Armies' and 'to provide and main-
tain a Navy.' . . . This certainly lays upon Congress primary responsi-
bility for supplying the armed forces. Congress alone controls the raising
of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in what manner
and by what means they shall be spent for military and naval procure-
ment.)6 7
The issues considered in the Youngstown case are similar in many re-
spects to the issue involved in the matter of utilizing funds to implement
Congressional defense policies. Without doubt Congress is empowered to
appropriate funds for defense purposes."8 This is the same basic consid-
eration involved in the Youngstown case, wherein Congress had provided
methods other than those employed by the President for the settlement
of labor disputes. Once Congress has enacted laws relative to the utiliza-
tion of appropriated funds for defense purposes, it is the President's duty
to see that they are "faithfully executed." The Constitution does not sub-
ject the law-making power of Congress to presidential control, except for
the veto process. The fact that Presidents in the past may have overridden
congressional appropriations does not deprive Congress of its constitu-
tional authority.
The matter of Congressional appropriations for defense purposes lies
in the third category of congressional-presidential relationships set forth
by Justice Jackson. "Exclusive presidential control" cannot be sustained
and the President is not empowered to impose conditions upon the exer-
cise of congressional authority in this field. 9 The weight of authority is
66. Id. at 635-38 (concurring opinion).
67. Id. at 643 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis omitted.)
68. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 30 (1st Antheneurn ed. 1963).
69. See Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court,
51 Mich. L. Rev. 141 (1952).
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against the existence of an inherent presidential power to impound ap-
propriated funds .7
VI. THE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
The general theory underlying the Constitution is that Congress shall
be responsible for the determination and approval of the fiscal policies
of the Nation and that the Executive shall be responsible for their faith-
ful execution.7 1 This division of authority was well stated by President
Wilson in a message to Congress on May 13, 1920:
The Congress and the Executive should function within their respective spheres ....
The Congress has the power and the right to grant or deny an appropriation, or
to enact or refuse to enact a law; but once an appropriation is made or a law
passed, the appropriation should be administered or the law executed by the ex-
ecutive branch of the Government.72
Congress then, has the final responsibility, subject to Constitutional
limitations and the President's veto power, for deciding which activities
are to be undertaken by the Government and the amount of money to
be spent on each. The President's role is to recommend to Congress a
unified and comprehensive budget and to administer the budget as finally
enacted.73
A distinction must be made between the authorization and the actual
appropriation of funds for a specified purpose. As indicated previously,"4
an act appropriating funds for defense purposes serves to implement a
preceding authorization act passed by Congress.
Because of some extremely broad authorizations of appropriations for
the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and vessels that were granted in
the 1940's, the Committee on Armed Services came close to legislating
away their major responsibilities in the shaping of defense legislation.7a
While the Committees on Armed Services retained jurisdiction over man-
power legislation, military pay measures, and military construction au-
thorizations, only a small part of the defense program for a fiscal year
came before these Committees for legislative review.70 As a result, the
Appropriations Committees alone gave substantial consideration to the
over-all defense budget.77
70. Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds: With Sp-al
Reference to Grants-In-Aid to Segregated Activities, 1i Am. U.L. Rev. 32, 42 (1962).
71. Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management at 15 (1937).
72. Ibid.
73. Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Report on
Budget and Accounting in the U.S. Government at 12-13 (1955).
74. See note 12 supra.
75. 10 Cong. Rec. 6303 (1962) (remarks of Senator Russell).
76. See generally Whelan, Legislative and Regulatory Activity in Research and Develop-
ment Contracting 59 (1963).
77. For an exhaustive study on the consideration of defense budgets by the Appropriations
Committees, see Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (1950).
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In the realization that a preponderant part of the defense program
was based on major weapons, the Committee proposed that appropriations
for procurement of major weapons should be subject to new authoriza-
tions.78
Public Law 86-14971 was the first law requiring congressional author-
ization for appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and
naval vessels. This law was subsequently modified by Public Law 87-4368'
to require similar authorization for the research, development, test, and
evaluation associated with aircraft, missiles and naval vessels.
Public Law 88-174 extended this authority to require authorization
of appropriations for all research, development, test, and evaluation car-
ried on by the Department of Defense. The law today reads as follows:
No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any
armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval
vessels, or after December 31, 1962, to or for the use of any armed force of the
United States for the research, development, test, or evaluation of aircraft, missiles,
or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1963, to or for the use of any armed force
of the United States for any research, development, test, or evaluation, unless the
appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such
dates. 81
It seems clear that an authorization of funds for a specific defense
purpose is not considered to eliminate the exercise of discretion as to
either the appropriation or the expenditure of funds for that purpose.
The meaning that Congress attaches to the term is indicated in the fol-
lowing colloquy which occurred on the floor of the House when it was
determined to "authorize" funds for the RS-70:
Mr. Brown: ...there has been a great deal of discussion throughout the years
as to what the word "authorized" really means, in connection with legislation, when the
President is authorized to do something. But the usual conclusion is that the will
of the Congress is expressed in using the word "authorized," and it also expresses the
desire of the Congress....82
Mrs. St. George: In other words, it means a pious hope-and sometimes-"Hope
deferred, maketh the heart sick"; is that correct?8 3
Mr. Brown: It goes a little further than that. I would suggest, if you check the
records, that while we authorize many expenditures, the money is not always
appropriated, and even if so, the expenditures are not always made by the President.
But usually when the word "authorized" is used in legislation, the Chief Executive
accepts it as more or less expressing the desire and the will of the Congress, and quite
often he goes along with that .... 4.
78. H.R. Rep. No. 1138, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963).
79. Act of Aug. 10, 1959, § 412(b), 73 Stat. 322.
80. Act of April 27, 1962, § 2, 76 Stat. 55.
81. 77 Stat. 329, 5 U.S.C. § 171a note (Supp. V, 1963).
82. 108 Cong. Rec. 4691 (1962) (remarks of Representative Brown).
83. Ibid (remarks of Representative St. George).
84. Ibid (remarks of Representative Brown).
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Mr. Cannon:... All Members of the House understand that the word "authorized,"
as used in this connotation, means "permitted"--and nothing more.s5
Although an authorization may be considered as only constituting
permission to expend funds for a particular purpose, an appropriation of
funds implies a directive that such funds be expended to effect the purpose
indicated.
An argument that the President's authority as Commander in Chief
gives him power to disregard a legislative mandate to use appropriated
funds for specified purposes which Congress has found necessary for
national defense, would seem equally applicable to any other legislation
relating to the armed forces. Yet Congress has enacted an enormous
amount of legislation on the subject and the Supreme Court has, from
time to time, struck down executive action found to be in conflict with
statutory provisions.", "It is recognized that Congress may grant or with-
hold appropriations as it chooses, and when making an appropriation
may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall be devoted. It
may also impose conditions with respect to the use of the appropriation,
provided that the conditions do not require operation of the Government
in a way forbidden by the Constitution. . ... s' The executive branch is
limited by the appropriation with respect to the amount, purpose and
period of availability of the money made available for obligation and
expenditure."5
The Naval Appropriation Act of March 3, 1909, provided that no part
of the appropriations therein made for the Marine Corps would be ex-
pended unless officers and enlisted men of that Corps served on board
certain vessels in detachments of not less than eight percent of the enlisted
men of the Navy on such vessels. 2
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority not only to designate
the purpose of the appropriation, but also the terms and conditions under which the
executive department of the government may expend such appropriations....
The purpose of the appropriations, the terms and conditions under which said
appropriations were made, is a matter solely in the hands of Congress and it is the
plain and explicit duty of the executive branch of the government to comply v.ith the
same. Any attempt by the judicial branch of our government to interfere vith the
exclusive powers of Congress would be a plain invasion of the powers of said body
conferred upon it by the Constitution of the United States.20
SS. Ibid (remarks of Representative Cannon).
86. See, e.g., Harman v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), where the action of the Secretary
of the Army in issuing less than honorable discharge to two soldiers was held inconistent
with law.
87. Brownell, supra note 50, at 3.
88. Chermak, Financial Control: Congress and the Executive Branch, 17 AMl. L. Rev.
83 (1962).
89. Act of larch 3, 1909, ch. 255, 35 Stat. 773. This provision vas considered constitu-
tional. 27 Ops. Att'y Gen. 259 (1909).
90. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 9S5, 9S3 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff'd, 154
F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946).
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The Supreme Court has also held that when Congress makes an ap-
propriation in terms which constitute a direction to pay a sum of money
to a particular person, the officers of the Treasury cannot refuse to make
the payment."'
Although none of these decisions squarely decide the point, they do
not lend any countenance to the proposition that the President can law-
fully disregard a direction embodied in law that certain measures be
taken for national defense and that specified appropriations be spent for
that purpose.
It may be claimed that Congress, by statute, has authorized the Presi-
dent to exercise discretion as to whether funds appropriated for particular
defense purposes should be expended or impounded. An examination of
legislation pertaining to appropriations does not support this contention.
The Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906 established the requirement
of agency apportionment of total appropriations into quarterly amounts,
providing that no more that one-fourth of the total appropriation might
be expended in any quarter of the fiscal year." This device was later
used to effect savings when the required purpose was accomplished for a
sum less than the amount of the appropriation.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provided for presidential
control over requests for funds for activities of the executive branch."
No provision was made, however, for such presidential control over the
expenditure of appropriated funds, regardless of whether such funds were
requested or were in excess of presidential requests.
Impounding of appropriated funds to prevent deficiencies and to effect
economies in governmental operations was authorized by the General Ap-
propriations Act of 1951.1' This Act provided, in part, as follows: "In
apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established to provide
for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible
by or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations,
or other developments subsequent to the date on which such appropria-
tion was made available .... )95
Since this section appears to grant the Executive great latitude with
respect to the impounding of appropriated funds, inquiry should be made
as to legislative intent. The House Committee on Appropriations stated
that the "appropriation of a given amount for a particular activity con-
stitutes only a ceiling upon the amount which should be expended for
91. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898); United States v. Price,
116 U.S. 43 (1885). Compare 22 Ops. Att'y Gen. 295 (1902).
92. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257; Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510,
§ 3, 34 Stat. 49.
93. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
94. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1211, 64 Stat. 765, 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (1958).
95. Ibid.
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that activity.""6 Officials responsible for the administration of an activity
for which an appropriation was made "bear the final burden for render-
ing all necessary service with the smallest amount possible within the
ceiling figure fixed by the Congress. 97 The purpose of the Act is to
"require careful apportionment of all types of funds expended by Federal
agencies and efficient administration of the Government's business." 3
The Committee noted that in signing the National Military Appropria-
tions Act for 1950, the President issued a statement indicating objections
to the action of Congress in increasing funds for the Air Force, and
directing the Secretary of Defense to place in reserve the amounts pro-
vided by Congress for increasing the Air Force structure. In this regard
it was stated that "it was not the purpose of the Congress in providing
funds for the Air Force... in excess of budget estimates to establish or
permit the President or the Secretary of Defense to establish re-
serves .... ,9" In the minds of the Committee, this action "amounted to
an item veto, a power not possessed by the President."1 °0
It is perfectly justifiable and proper for all possible economies to be effected and
savings to be made, but there is no warrant or justification for the thwarting of a
major policy of Congress by the impounding of funds. If this principle of thwarting
the will of Congress by the impounding of funds should be accepted as correct,
then Congress would be totally incapable of carrying out its constitutional mandate
of providing for the defense of the Nation.101
Certainly it was not the intent of Congress that the Executive should
be enabled to impound funds appropriated by Congress for defense pur-
poses. There appears to be no statutory authority for the impounding of
appropriated funds, except for purposes of economy and efficiency in
executing the purposes for which the appropriation is made L2
An appropriation act may delegate discretion to the President or
another executive officer in regard to expenditure. Where no such delega-
tion exists, however, the appropriation should be considered a mandate,
rather than mere permission to spend.
The President cannot dispense with the execution of the laws, under
the duty to see that they are executed. To hold otherwise would be to
confer upon him a veto power over laws duly passed and enrolled. To ac-
cord discretion to a President as to what laws should be enforced and how
much, would enable him to interpose a veto retroactively.
96. H.R. Rep. No. 1797, SIst Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9 (1950).
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Id. at 309.
100. Id. at 310.
101. Id. at 311.
102. Goostree, supra note 70, at 47.
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VII. ENFORCING CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
If we may conclude that Congress has the constitutional right to require
the Defense Department to expend appropriated funds for specified de-
fense purposes, the question remains as to how that requirement can be
enforced. Merely having the right is not sufficient if it cannot be effec-
tively exercised.
It is doubtful that enforcement could be had through the courts. The
fact that no suit has been instituted as a result of the many recent in-
stances of the impounding of funds indicates a lack of standing to sue.
The nature of acts appropriating funds for defense purposes is seldom
such as to give rise to a justiciable controversy.
The executive veto does not include the power to veto a part of a bill.
The lack of such a power in the President has enabled Congress at times
to bring pressure on a president, thus enabling the enactment of legisla-
tion that the President might otherwise veto. That is, a measure desired
by Congress may be included as a proviso, or attached as a rider, to a
bill desired by the executive branch.10 3 The undesired portion of the act
must then be accepted, or the entire measure rejected by the President.
In this manner, Congress may on occasion enforce the expenditure of
funds for a particular purpose. This procedure is, of course, subject to
acquiescence on the part of the President. If the President vetoed the
bill because of the objectionable portion, it might be difficult to obtain
sufficient support in Congress to override the veto. This, then, is not a
very adequate means whereby Congress may require certain expendi-
tures, particularly if the matter of defeating the measure is of sufficient
importance to the Executive.
The strongest check which the legislative branch holds on the executive
branch is, of course, impeachment. The Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. °4
Throughout the history of the Nation only twelve impeachment trials
have been held, resulting in the conviction of four members of the judi-
ciary but not one executive officer. 105 In the only case of the impeach-
ment of a President, that of President Johnson in 1868, the Senate de-
clined to convict by a margin of one vote.
103. See, e.g., Act of July 13, 1955, ch. 358, 69 Stat. 304, which appropriated funds
for army maintenance and operations and contained the following proviso: "Provided,
That during the fiscal year 1956 the maintenance, operation, and availability of the
Army-Navy Hospital at Hot Springs National Park, Arkansas, and the Murphy General
Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts, to meet requirements of the military and naval forces
shall be continued."
104. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
105. Staff of House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Extent of the
Control of the Executive by the Congress of the United States at 27 (Comm. Print 1962).
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A problem would be to determine whether the refusal to expend funds
in implementation of a defense measure enacted by Congress could be
considered a "high crime" or "misdemeanor." The manager of the im-
peachment of President Johnson contended that "an impeachable high
crime or misdemeanor is one in its nature or consequences subversive of
some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prej-
udicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the
Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of a duty, by an act committed
or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discre-
tionary powers from improper motives or for an improper purpose.111c
Failure to expend funds under some circumstances could well fit within
this definition.
Actually, the impeachment of a President will probably never again
be attempted except under the most aggravated circumstances. In fact,
it has been predicted that the next President to be impeached "will have
asked for the extreme medicine by committing a low personal rather than
a high political crime-by shooting a Senator, for example."M 07
As a practical matteri Congress would never attempt to force its will
as to the expenditure of funds through the power of impeachment. If
feeling ran that high in Congress over the matter, the political pressures
and public feeling would undoubtedly be sufficient to force the issue.
While the threat of impeachment might compel desired expenditures,
it should be noted that impeachment does not accomplish this result, since
failure to so act would be the basis for the action itself. All in all, Con-
gress' power of impeachment cannot be considered as a means of requir-
ing defense expenditures.
VIII. POLT.ICAL CoNsmERATIONS
Certain acts of Congress, such as the Budget and Accounting Act of
192 1,OS invite presidential leadership. When Congress gave up primary
responsibility for preparing the budget it gave a tremendous boost to
the power of the President, not only to control his administration, but to
influence the legislative process.109
The President's role is to recommend to Congress a unified and com-
prehensive budget, and to administer the budget as finally enacted. The
Executive Budget, with its accompanying message, constitutes a syste-
matic and detailed statement of objectives and means for the guidance of
the legislature. With respect to the administration of the budget, the
106. Corwin, The President-Office and Powers 351-52 (rev. ed. 1957). Sce gnerall=y
Concerning the Remov-al of Officers, 30 Cong. Dig. No. 2, p. 40 (1951).
107. Rossiter, The American Presidency 35 (1956).
10S. 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
109. See generally Rossiter, op. cit. supra note 107, at 65-65.
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
President is the manager of the executive branch. He is responsible for
its efficient operation within the framework laid down by Congress.
The President must evolve his program for national defense through
the integration of military, budgetary, and diplomatic factors. The Presi-
dent, in whom are combined the roles of chief executive, commander in
chief, and conductor of foreign relations, declares to Congress that a given
military force, constituted and balanced in a particular fashion, is es-
sential for national security and the support of foreign policy. The great
powers of the President must be recognized and vast discretion must
be accorded him in their exercise. But at the same time, Congress is
clearly within its constitutional rights in exercising finality of decision
in regard to the nature and size of the military force. As a general rule,
however, Congress should show restraint in this role. It should establish
within the executive branch the most effective agencies possible for over-
all planning and follow their recommendations. For Congress, for all its
powers of raising and supporting armies, cannot function as a military
staff or as the agency for originating overall plans for national security.u 0
The difficulty in securing a large increase in the President's budget for
a particular defense purpose is that those who advocate it must also
advocate either an increase in taxes, deficit financing, or a drastic cut
somewhere else in the budget. None of these alternatives will normally be
seen by others as especially attractive.
Should the advocates of a large increase succeed in persuading their
colleagues that it is desirable-and this must be done in the face of ex-
pert testimony that it is not necessary-and should Congress duly ap-
propriate the sum, there still remains the problem of getting the President
to spend it. Congress has no formal power to secure his compliance, and
can only hope to build a powerful consensus in support of the increase.
If the President has the support of the "experts," Congress has little
prospect of effecting major changes in the President's budget."'
It has been suggested that, in order to help resolve conflict between
Congress and the President over responsibility for the making of military
policy, "the purposes for which the armed forces [are] .. .used might
be divided into those of a long-term character and those which are im-
mediate and of a very temporary effect.""' 2 The former permits delibera-
110. See generally L. Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (1951).
111. See generally Schilling, Hammond & Snyder, Strategy Politics, and Defense Budgets
(1962), for an analysis of the interplay of different interests in the preparation of a
defense budget, with emphasis on the budget for the 1950 fiscal year.
112. Koenig, The Presidency and the Crisis 53 (1944). See H.R. Doc. No. 443, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1956), which contains a chronological listing of actions related to the
exercise of the powers of the President as Commander in Chief from 1789-1955, and ex-
cerpts from sources dealing with the exercise of these powers in the period 1935-1955, and
therefore proves a convenient reference for such material.
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tion, a quality in which the Legislature excels, and the latter requires celer-
ity of action, which the Executive is best able to supply. Considerations of
administrative convenience would assign the long-term determinations
to Congress acting in conjunction with the President, and reserve the
temporary matters for the independent action of the President.
Warner Schilling discusses five problems connected with the defense
budget which make it extremely difficult to determine how much to spend:
First is the problem of purpose. Defense preparations have no mean-
ing except in their relationship to the foreign policy purposes of the
nation.
The second is that posed by the existence of alternative means. And if
it is not always easy to identify the foreign policy purposes for which
preparations may be required, it is even more difficult to specify the
means which will best serve those purposes.
The determination of the size and kind of forces required would be
easier if it were not for the third problem: that caused by the fact that
the future is normally uncertain and indeterminate. It is impossible to
predict with assurance which of the nation's purposes will be challenged,
or how and when.
The kind of armament a nation carries may have a most significant in-
fluence on the course of its political life. The need to estimate this
influence in advance constitutes the fourth major problem in defense
budgeting. Nor is it always an easy matter to tell whether additional
arms will have a provocative or a deterrent effect, whether they will serve
to ease or to exacerbate security problems with other nations.
Last but not least, there is the problem of cost. Security is not the
only national goal, nor is defense the only activity that lays claim to the
government's budget. Resources allocated to defense are resources no
longer available for the satisfaction of other values. Where is the balance
to be struck; what constitutes a rational allocation of national resources?
The questions of value involved are, in the final analysis, matters of
personal preference. Inevitably, then, there will be differences and un-
certainty-regarding the foreign policy goals to be served; regarding the
relative utility of the various means available to implement those goals;
regarding the shape of the future; regarding the impact on that future
of the means under consideration; and regarding the costs it is desirable
to incur for defense.
Mr. Schilling concludes that uncertainties and differences of this order
can have but one result. Good, intelligent, and dedicated men will be
found on all sides of the question of how much and what kind of defense
the nation should buy. The fact that questions of value are at stake in-
sures that there can be no one determinate answer to the problem of how
much to spend for defense.
There are, accordingly, no individuals who can provide determinate
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answers: not in the Defense Department, in the State Department, in
Congress, or in the Office of the President. Choice is unavoidable: choice
among the values to be served, and choice among the divergent concep-
tions of what will happen if such and such is done.
It is for this reason, says Mr. Schilling, that the defense budget, while
susceptible to rational analysis, remains a matter for political resolution.
Choices of this order can be made in only one place: the political arena.
There the relative importance of values can be decided by the relative
power brought to bear on their behalf.
The central fact about the defense budget is that it is a political prob-
lem. It turns on the desire and ability of the administration and Congress
to undertake the necessary tasks of persuasion." 8
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is concluded that Congress does have the authority to determine the
size and nature of the armed forces, and to require the expenditure of
funds authorized and appropriated for particular defense purposes. Con-
gress does not have, however, adequate power or means to enforce its
authority against unyielding opposition on the part of the President.
The problem of an adequate defense budget and appropriate defense
expenditures is primarily political in nature and should be determined on
that basis.
It is recommended that the power of Congress, in voting on the Execu-
tive Budget, be limited so that it might appropriate no more than the
Executive requested to run the Government, as organized by Congress
through general laws. Congress would retain control over appropriations
within the ceiling set by the Executive and could thus reduce or eliminate
certain activities as deemed appropriate.
Separate and apart from the Executive Budget, Congress could au-
thorize and appropriate funds for added programs desired by Congress
but not requested by the Executive. The President could veto such bills,
if he so desired. If Congress should override his veto, then the President
should carry such programs into effect. This would eliminate undesirable
riders to essential appropriations acts and the dubious practice of im-
pounding funds. It would also give the President and Congress an op-
portunity to resolve disputed matters outside normal budget procedures.
113. Schilling, Hammond & Snyder, supra note 111, at 10-15, 214, 233.
